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France: From Acknowledgement of Debt to Bankruptcy (1789–1797)

Do CounterPunch, 20 de novembro 2026
Por Eric Toussaint


Pierre Joseph Cambon. Engraving by Françoise Bonneville. Public domain.

The French Revolution brought an end to the Ancien Régime, but it long hesitated to break with the financial commitments entered into by the monarchy. While it abolished the tax privileges of the nobility and the clergy, it initially preserved the claims of the Ancien Régime’s creditors. For several years, the revolutionary governments upheld the principle of public debt repayment and sought to guarantee creditors’ income, even as the state’s finances were in a catastrophic state.

This policy was championed in particular by Joseph Cambon, who intended to win over creditors to the Republic by making it their new debtor. The Grand Livre de la dette publique (General Ledger of Public Debt) was created in August 1793 to guarantee the continuity of the state’s financial commitments.

However, the ongoing war, the escalating deficit, the collapse of the assignats, and the state’s inability to meet its usual payments gradually rendered this policy untenable. On 30 September 1797, the Directory made a decisive move: the so-called “two-thirds” default. Two-thirds of the public debt recorded in the General Ledger was written off. This measure constituted a massive repudiation of the debt and made it possible to considerably reduce the burden of the State’s financial obligations.

The progression from acknowledging the debts of the Ancien Régime to their partial repudiation in 1797 is particularly significant. It shows that decisions regarding public debt are never purely a matter of financial technique: they reflect social and political power relations and determine who benefits from the distribution of the nation’s resources.

1789: the Revolution abolished tax privileges, but protected the monarchy’s creditors

The French Revolution of 1789 broke out against a backdrop of a profound financial crisis facing the monarchy. One major cause of this crisis was the monarchy’s inability to modernise its tax system and end the privileges of the nobility and clergy.

The scale of the financial crisis was considerable. On the eve of the Revolution, the monarchy was faced with massive debt, a chronic budget deficit and the inability of its institutions to reform a deeply unequal tax system. A significant proportion of the state’s revenue was absorbed by interest payments to the monarchy’s creditors. This left all the fewer resources available to meet the needs of the population, while the authorities continued to levy particularly heavy taxes on the working class.

The convening of the Estates-General was initially intended to resolve this financial crisis. But the protest against fiscal injustice and the privileges of the Ancien Régime led to a much more profound political and social revolution. The working classes who took part in this revolution were not merely demanding equality before the tax system and the abolition of privileges. They also aspired to a substantial improvement in their living conditions, the fulfilment of their basic needs, and a reduction in economic and social inequalities.

The Revolution’s fundamental limitations included the failure to achieve lasting abolition of slavery, end the slave trade, or grant women political rights, including voting and election eligibility, while social and legal inequalities persisted.

In this process of political and social transformation, one major element of continuity was preserved: the debts owed to the monarchy’s creditors. While the Revolution abolished the tax privileges of the nobility and the clergy, it protected the claims of the Ancien Régime’s creditors and guaranteed the continuity of their income. The financial bourgeoisie had a clear material interest in the continued repayment of the public debt, which provided it with a regular income. It was able to support the overthrow of the Ancien Régime and the abolition of privileges without relinquishing the debts that formed part of its assets and secured its income.

This continuity had political and social consequences. By upholding the financial commitments inherited from the monarchy, the new regime recognised the priority of creditors’ rights and limited its room for manoeuvre in responding to popular expectations. It was not merely a question of who should pay taxes but also of determining to which needs the nation’s resources should be allocated. Preserving the income of the financial bourgeoisie thus came into conflict with aspirations for a more profound social transformation.

The choices made regarding public debt must also be viewed in the context of the transformation of land ownership. The sale of national assets – consisting mainly of Church property and, subsequently, property confiscated from émigrés – led to a considerable transfer of ownership. The urban bourgeoisie, merchants, financiers and wealthy rural landowners were among the main beneficiaries of these sales. The bourgeoisie, which continued to receive income from its claims on the state, was thus able to strengthen its wealth by acquiring land previously held, in particular, by the Church and the nobility.

Jean Jaurès, in his *Socialist History of the French Revolution*, establishes a direct link between the issue of debt and that of land redistribution. He writes: ‘The immediate problem, vital to the Revolution, was not to grant property to those who had none, but to give land to the State’s creditors, whom it was impossible to repay in any other way.’[1]

He emphasised that the urban bourgeoisie were the primary purchasers of national property, thereby augmenting their industrial and commercial power through land ownership.

While some peasants managed to buy land, sometimes by joining forces, these acquisitions should not obscure the profound inequality in access to property. The poorest peasants, agricultural day labourers and the landless generally lacked the necessary resources to take part in the auctions. Even collective purchases by peasants remained limited and subsequently tended to benefit the wealthier members of the associations. The bourgeoisie received the majority of the benefits.

Added to this inequality of access to property was the challenge to the collective use of communal lands. The transformation of these assets into individual properties, notably through measures to abolish communal lands, considerably reduced the resources essential to a large proportion of peasant families – and in particular to the poorest rural groups – by severely restricting or completely denying their access to pastures and woodlands, as well as their opportunities for gleaning and exercising other collective usage rights. The commodification of land and the encroachment on communal property have favoured the interests of the bourgeoisie.

Daniel Guérin, in Class Struggle under the First Republic: The Bourgeoisie and the ‘Bare-Armed’ (1793–1797)[2], provides a detailed analysis of the conflict between the interests of the revolutionary bourgeoisie and the aspirations of the popular masses. Albert Soboul’s work on the sans-culottes also shows that they demanded the right to a livelihood, equality in the consumption of foodstuffs and a limit on property inequalities[3]. The issue of bread—its price and availability—thus became a major political concern. The Revolution could not, therefore, be reduced to the defence of property and the reorganisation of institutions: it also encompassed demands for social justice and an improvement in material living conditions.

The Revolution led to a significant shift in land ownership, but this change primarily favoured the wealthiest segments of society, leaving the vast majority of peasant families unsupported. The financial and commercial bourgeoisie was able to reap multiple benefits: it retained its claims on the state and increased its landholdings. By contrast, a significant proportion of poor peasants and urban workers did not enjoy a corresponding improvement in their material conditions.

Joseph Cambon: republicanising the debt to win over creditors to the Republic

It is against this backdrop that the approach championed by Joseph Cambon (1756–1820) must be understood. A merchant from Montpellier, elected as deputy for the Hérault to the Legislative Assembly in 1791 and then to the National Convention in 1792, Cambon became one of the key figures in the public finance of the Revolution. As a member of the Finance Committee, where he became a leading figure, he gained a reputation as an expert on financial matters and also served on the first Committee of Public Safety in 1793.

As early as 24 November 1791, he proposed converting outstanding debts into perpetual debt: the principal would no longer be repayable at the creditors’ request, but interest would continue to be paid to them.

In August 1793, he advocated the creation of the Grand Livre de la dette publique, intended to bring together all debts recognised by the Republic—including those inherited from the Ancien Régime—and to ensure their consolidation. His political reasoning was explicit: ‘You will see the capitalist who desires a King, because he has a King as his debtor […] come to desire the Republic, which will have become his debtor, because he will fear losing his capital by losing it.’[4]

He summed up this approach with the phrase: ‘Let us republicanise the debt, and all the creditors of the debt will be republicans.’[5]

In this manner, he aimed to persuade the creditors to support the Republic by connecting their financial interests to the continued existence of the new regime. He wanted: ‘the debt incurred by the despotic regime could no longer be distinguished from that incurred since the Revolution.’[6]

A point that clarifies Cambon’s position is also worth noting. The man who organised the consolidation of the public debt and vigorously defended the Republic’s credit was himself a purchaser of national property. On 14 May 1793, during a debate initiated by Buzot on the increase in the wealth of certain deputies, Cambon acknowledged before the Convention that he was “a purchaser of national property.” The acquisitions of national property by Cambon and his family are, moreover, attested to by the historical works devoted to this issue.

This fact is worth emphasising. Cambon was not an outside observer of the economic and financial system he helped to establish. He also belonged to the category of purchasers of national property, in a context where the sale of such property, the circulation of assignats and the debt consolidation policy were closely interlinked. This is not to imply an accusation of corruption but rather to note that the financial policy he championed formed part of a system from which he himself also derived financial benefit.

In his Socialist History of the French Revolution, Jean Jaurès describes Cambon as “the growling watchdog who guarded the Revolution’s credit.” He shows, however, that the circumstances of the war and the worsening deficit were beginning to shift the balance of power. These led to the suspension of part of the repayments on the debt owed. This development revealed the tensions between safeguarding creditors’ rights and the necessities of defending the Revolution.

From consolidation to financial deadlock

Cambon’s policy was based on a conviction: by guaranteeing creditors, the Republic would consolidate its legitimacy and be able to benefit from their support. But recognising the claims was not enough to restore public finances. It failed to resolve the problems of the state’s resources, the accumulation of deficits, and the economic and social consequences of the war.

The Republic’s financial situation continued to deteriorate. The collapse of the assignats, rampant inflation, military expenditure and the State’s inability to meet its payments as normal made it increasingly unrealistic to honour previous commitments.

Servicing the debt thus faces a major contradiction: whilst public resources are insufficient to meet the needs of the state and the population, repaying creditors remains a priority. Upholding public credit is increasingly at odds with the material and political necessities of the Republic.

Successive governments, however, were reluctant to break with the financial commitments inherited from the monarchy. The fear of a loss of confidence and the country’s financial isolation remained a central argument against repudiating the debt. The deeply entrenched conviction was that a state must honour its commitments in full, regardless of the circumstances or social consequences.

But financial difficulties eventually forced a decision that previous governments had long refused to take.

30 September 1797: the two-thirds default

On 9 Vendémiaire, Year VI (30 September 1797), the Directory government, at the instigation of its Minister of Finance, Dominique-Vincent Ramel, adopted a radical measure. Two-thirds of the public debt recorded in the General Ledger was written off. The remaining third was retained and became the “consolidated third”.

The law of 24 Frimaire Year VI (14 December 1797) set out the terms of this operation.

In exchange for the two-thirds that were written off, creditors received bearer bonds, which were intended, among other things, to be used to acquire national assets. However, these securities rapidly lost value. In less than a year, their value fell by around 60 per cent compared with their face value. Their devaluation then continued until they became virtually worthless.

The decision has gone down in history as the “two-thirds bankruptcy”.

The actual scope of the measure went far beyond the nominal two-thirds reduction in the debt. Creditors lost not only two-thirds of their original claims but also a large proportion of the value of the compensation they were given in return. This was effectively a massive repudiation, the economic effects of which were even greater than its official title suggests.

The historian William Doyle points out that this operation significantly reduced the state’s annual debt-servicing burden[7]. The bankruptcy thus made it possible to break away from a system in which interest payments absorbed a very significant proportion of public resources.

This operation is not merely an accounting manoeuvre. The state is making creditors bear a substantial portion of the accumulated losses and is freeing up resources so that it no longer has to devote as much to servicing its financial commitments.

A belated decision, but one that helps restore public finances

The two-thirds default does not instantly bring about a return to prosperity. The Directory must still restore the functioning of the tax administration, rebuild public revenue and meet the considerable military expenditure. Confidence in public credit has been seriously undermined, and the scope for borrowing again is limited. The aggrieved creditors are quick to condemn the decision and its consequences.

But one must consider the financial outcomes of this default.

The annual debt burden was considerably reduced. The State found itself freed from a substantial portion of the payments it had previously been obliged to make to holders of government securities. It was able to gradually reorganise its finances and regain a capacity for action that had largely been compromised.

The economist Thomas Piketty highlights the significance of this decision in Capital in the Twenty-First Century(2013). He writes that the ‘two-thirds bankruptcy’ of 1797—which in reality constituted an even more massive default, given the episode involving the assignats and the resulting inflation—‘made it possible to settle the accounts of the Ancien Régime’. He adds that French public debt was thus reduced to extremely low levels at the start of the 19th century, standing at less than 20 per cent of national income in 1815[8].

The work of the economist François Velde, published in 2024 by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, confirms the scale of this reduction: by 1802, French public debt accounted for no more than around 10 per cent of gross domestic product[9]. This was a particularly low level given the financial situation inherited from the Revolution.

The bankruptcy of 1797 thus marked a major turning point in the history of French public finances. It did not, on its own, resolve all the country’s economic and budgetary difficulties. But it allowed for a break from unsustainable debt and set the stage for financial recovery.

Great Britain: the cost of full repayment

The comparison with Great Britain, also explored by Thomas Piketty, is particularly illuminating.

To finance the American War of Independence, followed by successive wars against revolutionary and Napoleonic France, the British monarchy chose to borrow on a massive scale. It honoured its commitments to creditors and ensured the payment of interest on the debt.

The outcome was very different from that seen in France. According to Piketty’s estimates, British debt reached nearly 200 per cent of national income in the 1810s, some ten times the French level at the same time. It then took nearly a century of budget surpluses to gradually bring this debt back down to below 30 per cent of national income by the early 1910s.

This considerable debt had a very tangible budgetary cost. According to historical data published in 2023 by the Office for Budget Responsibility, an independent UK body responsible for analysing public finances, interest payments on the debt accounted for nearly 40 per cent of the British government’s annual revenue around 1815[10]. In other words, the state used nearly two-fifths of the pounds it collected in public revenue to pay the holders of debt securities.

This situation persisted for several decades. Tax revenue that could have been allocated to other areas of public spending had to be largely devoted to repaying creditors. The United Kingdom thus had to bear the long-term cost of its decision to honour its financial commitments in full.

This comparison does not imply that the economic trajectories of the two countries can be explained solely by their debt policies. Wars, economic structures and political conditions also played a part. However, it highlights a fundamental difference in the way the two states treated their creditors and the financial consequences of their choices.

A lesson for current debates on public debt

The history of French public debt between 1789 and 1797 is one of major political change. Initially, the Revolution guaranteed the monarchy’s debts and sought to win over capital holders to the new regime. Under Cambon, it went so far as to make debt consolidation a means of securing creditors’ political loyalty to the Republic.

But this policy came up against financial, economic and social realities. It became increasingly difficult to honour these commitments, while the needs of the State and the population remained considerable. In 1797, the Directory ultimately imposed massive losses on creditors.

The two-thirds write-off was a brutal measure. Yet the French experience shows that warnings about the supposedly catastrophic consequences of calling debts into question should not be accepted as indisputable economic truths. The repudiation of a considerable portion of the debt enabled France to radically reduce the burden of its financial commitments and regain fiscal leeway.

The comparison with Great Britain is instructive in this regard: while France was ridding itself of a large part of its debt through default, the United Kingdom devoted a considerable proportion of its public revenue to paying interest on the debt for several generations.

Finally, this history serves as a reminder that the recognition or repudiation of public debt is never a neutral decision. It determines which social interests are protected, who bears the losses, and what resources remain available to meet the needs of the population.

The French bankruptcy of 1797 is not an isolated episode. It marks the beginning of a long history of repudiations, cancellations and restructurings of public debt, including in Northern countries, which have at times made it possible to emerge from particularly difficult financial situations. To find out more about debt repudiations from the late 18th century to the 21st century: See the timeline: Sovereign Debt Repudiations: Stepping Stones in History », published 14 April 2025, As well as the book: The Debt System. A History of Sovereign Debts and Their Repudiation, Haymarket, Chicago, 2019.

Notes.

[1] Jean Jaurès, *A Socialist History of the French Revolution*, Volume I, *The Constituent Assembly (1789–1791)*, Paris: Jules Rouff, 1901, chapter ‘National Property’, pp. 436–521. See in particular his analysis of the links between public debt, the sale of national property and the establishment of a new system of land ownership. https://fr.wikisource.org/w/index

[2] Daniel Guérin, Class Struggle under the First Republic: The Bourgeoisie and the ‘Unarmed’ (1793–1797), Paris, Gallimard, 1946, 2 volumes.

[3] Albert Soboul, The Parisian Sans-culottes in Year II. A Political and Social History of the Sections of Paris, 2 June 1793–9 Thermidor Year II, Paris, Clavreuil, 1958. On demands for equality, the right to subsistence, the bread crisis and the limitation of inequalities in consumption, see also Albert Soboul, ‘The Sans-culottes and the French Revolution’, *Annales. Économies, sociétés, civilisations*, vol. 18, no. 6, 1963.

[4] Pierre-Joseph Cambon, Report on the public debt, on the measures to be taken to record it in a ledger and consolidate it; to accept the consolidated debt in payment for national estates that are for sale; to withdraw and cancel the old debt instruments; to expedite the liquidation; to establish the annual method of payment of the consolidated debt in the district capitals, and to withdraw assignats from circulation, presented to the National Convention on 15 August 1793. See also the Parliamentary Archives from 1787 to 1860, First Series, Volume LXXII, Paris, 1907, pp. 196–214 and pp. 706–731 for the decree concerning the compilation of the Grand Livre, adopted on 24 August 1793.https://www.persee.fr/issue/ The wording and the passage relating to capitalists are also reproduced in Senate Information Report No. 549 (2008–2009), France in a state of financial limbo: regaining our bearings to prepare for the end of the crisis, 8 July 2009, note 49.

[5] For the phrase ‘Let us make the debt republican, and all the debt’s creditors will be republicans’, see Jean-Claude Ducros, *L’Emprunt de l’État*, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2008.

[6] Pierre-Joseph Cambon, Report on the Public Debt, 15 August 1793. Already cited.

[7] William Doyle, *The Oxford History of the French Revolution*, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2002, Chapter 14, ‘The Directory, 1795–1799’, p. 333. The historian argues that the bankruptcy of the two-thirds relieved the State of commitments that were costing it 160 million livres a year and paved the way for a sustainable reconstruction of public finances.

[8] Thomas Piketty, *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*, Seuil, Paris, 2013, pp. 206–207.

[9] François R. Velde, ‘The French Public Debt in the Nineteenth Century’, Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, No. 2, April 2024, https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/economic-perspectives/2024/2, in particular the introduction and conclusion. The author estimates that by 1802, French public debt stood at just 10 per cent of GDP, compared with 65 per cent in 1789.

[10] Luke Lanskey and Conor O’Loughnan, ‘300 years of UK public finance data’, Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR), 20 July 2023, section ‘The imperial century (1815–1914)’. The authors state that in 1815, the UK’s public debt stood at around 180 per cent of GDP and that interest payments accounted for nearly two-fifths of the government’s annual revenue. https://articles.obr.uk/300-years-of-uk-public-finance-data/index.html

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